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ABSTRACT
In statistical learning, a dataset is oen partitioned into two parts:
the training set and the holdout (i.e., testing) set. For instance, the
training set is used to learn a predictor, and then the holdout set is
used for estimating the accuracy of the predictor on the true dis-
tribution. However, oen in practice, the holdout dataset is reused
and the estimates tested on the holdout dataset are chosen adap-
tively based on the results of prior estimates, leading to that the
predictor may become dependent of the holdout set. Hence, over-
fiing may occur, and the learned models may not generalize well
to the unseen datasets. Prior studies have established connections
between the stability of a learning algorithm and its ability to gen-
eralize, but the traditional generalization is not robust to adaptive
composition. Recently, Dwork et al. in NIPS, STOC, and Science
2015 show that the holdout dataset from i.i.d. data samples can
be reused in adaptive statistical learning, if the estimates are per-
turbed and coordinated using techniques developed for differen-
tial privacy, which is a widely used notion to quantify privacy. Yet,
the results of Dwork et al. are applicable to only the case of i.i.d.
samples. In contrast, correlations between data samples exist be-
cause of various behavioral, social, and genetic relationships be-
tween users. Our results in adaptive statistical learning generalize
the results of Dwork et al. for i.i.d. data samples to arbitrarily cor-
related data. Specifically, we show that the holdout dataset from
correlated samples can be reused in adaptive statistical learning, if
the estimates are perturbed and coordinated using techniques de-
veloped for Bayesian differential privacy, which is a privacy notion
recently introduced by Yang et al. in SIGMOD 2015 to broaden the
application scenarios of differential privacy when data records are
correlated.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In many statistical learning algorithms, a common practice is to
partition a dataset into two parts: the training set and the holdout
(i.e., testing) set. For instance, aer the training set is used to learn
a predictor, the holdout set is used for estimating the accuracy of
the predictor on the true distribution. However, in many practical
applications, since (i) the holdout dataset is reused, and (ii) the es-
timates tested on the holdout dataset are chosen adaptively based
on the results of prior estimates, we observe that the predictormay
become dependent of the holdout set. is leads to the result that
overfiing may occur, and the learned models may not generalize
well to the unseen datasets. Several papers [7, 29, 31, 35] in the
literature have established connections between the stability of a
learning algorithm and its ability to generalize, but the traditional
generalization is not robust to adaptive composition [3, 10, 13]. To
remedy this issue, Dwork et al. [12–14] recently show that the
holdout dataset from i.i.d. data samples can be reused in adap-
tive statistical learning, if the estimates are perturbed and coor-
dinated using techniques developed for differential privacy, which
has emerged as the standard notion to quantify privacy and will
be elaborated next.
Differential privacy by Dwork et al. [11, 16] is a privacy notion
that has been successfully applied to a range of statistical learn-
ing tasks, since it offers a rigorous foundation for defining privacy.
Differential privacy has received considerable interest in the liter-
ature [4, 27, 36, 40, 41, 43]. e Chrome browser by Google has
used a differentially private tool called RAPPOR [18] to collect in-
formation about clients. Starting from iOS 10, Apple [1] has in-
corporated differential privacy into its mobile operating system. A
randomized mechanism Y satisfies ϵ-differential privacy if for all
neighboring databases x and x ′ that differ in one record, and for
any subsetY of the output range of the mechanism Y , it holds that
P[Y (x) ∈ Y] ≤ eϵP[Y (x ′) ∈ Y],where P[·] denotes the probability
and e is a mathematical constant that is the base of the natural log-
arithm. Intuitively, under differential privacy, an adversary given
access to the output does not have much confidence to determine
whether the output was sampled from the probability distribution
generated by the randomized algorithm when the database is x or
when the database is x ′ that is different from x by one record.
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Dwork et al. [12–14] show that the holdout dataset from i.i.d.
data samples can be reused in adaptive statistical learning, if the
estimates are perturbed and coordinated using algorithms satis-
fying differential privacy. ese efforts by Dwork et al. [12–14]
have aracted significant aention to adaptive statistical learning
[3, 5, 10, 33, 34]. However, existing studies for adaptive statistical
learning including those of Dwork et al. [12–14] are applicable to
only the case of i.i.d. samples. In contrast, correlations between
data samples exist because of various behavioral, social, and ge-
netic relationships between users [44]. In location privacy, a user’s
locations across time exhibit temporal correlations [30, 38, 41], and
locations of friends tend to have social correlations since they are
likely to visit the same place [2, 26]. In genome privacy, DNA in-
formation is passed from parents to children based on Mendelian
inheritance so family members’ genotypes are correlated, where a
genotype is the set of genes in DNA responsible for a particular
trait [21]. In short, real-world data samples may contain a rich set
of correlations.
Our results in adaptive statistical learning generalize recent work
of Dwork et al. [12–14] for i.i.d. data samples to arbitrarily cor-
related data. In other words, we tackle adaptive statistical learn-
ing with correlated data samples while Dwork et al. [12–14] con-
sider only i.i.d. samples. Specifically, we show that the holdout
dataset from correlated samples can be reused in adaptive statisti-
cal learning, if the estimates are perturbed and coordinated using
techniques developed for Bayesian differential privacy, a privacy
notion recently introduced by Yang et al. [42] to address correla-
tions in a database. It has been observed by Kifer and Machanava-
jjhala [23] (see also [8, 20, 24, 26, 38, 44, 45]) that differential privacy
may not work as expectedwhen the data tuples are correlated. e
underlying reason according to Zhao et al. [44] is that differential
privacy’s guarantee masks only the presence of those records re-
ceived from each user, but could not mask statistical trends that
may reveal information about each user. Bayesian differential pri-
vacy [42] broadens the application scenarios of differential privacy
when data records are correlated. For clarity, we defer the detailed
definition of Bayesian differential privacy to Section 2.3.
e rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss some
preliminaries in Section 2, before presenting our results of adaptive
statistical learning in Section 3. Section 4 provides experiments to
support our results. We elaborate the proofs in Section 5. Section
6 surveys related work, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Adaptive Statistical Learning
Dwork et al. [12] show that differential privacy techniques can
be leveraged in adaptive statistical learning for i.i.d. data sam-
ples. To this end, they introduce the notion of approximate max-
information, establish a connection of differential privacy to ap-
proximate max-information, and utilize this connection to present
an algorithm for adaptive statistical learning.
For two random variablesX and Y , letX ×Y be the random vari-
able obtained by drawing X and Y independently from their prob-
ability distributions, and let domain(X ,Y ) be the domain of (X ,Y ).
Dwork et al. [12] define the notion of β-approximatemax-information
as follows:
I
β
∞(X ;Y ) def= log maxO⊆domain(X ,Y ):
P[(X ,Y )∈O]>β
P [(X ,Y ) ∈ O] − β
P [X × Y ∈ O] , (1)
where β > 0 and log means the binary logarithm. Approximate
max-information gives generalization since it upper bounds the
probability of “bad events” that can occur as a result of the depen-
dence of the learning result Y (X ) on the dataset X ; see [12, Page
10] for more details. Specifically, it is straightforward to obtain
from (1) that if
I
β
∞(X ;Y (X )) = k,
then
P [(X ,Y ) ∈ O] ≤ 2k · P [X × Y ∈ O] + β
for any O ⊆ domain(X ,Y ).
Statistical learning considered in this paper is as follows: For
an unknown distributionD over a discrete universe X of possible
data points, a statistical query Q asks for the expected value of
some function f : X → [0, 1] on random draws from D. e
goal is to ensure that the estimate obtained from data is close to
the true result on the unknown distribution. We consider queries
Q1,Q2, . . . that are chosen adaptively based on the results of prior
estimates.
2.2 Differential Privacy
A randomized algorithm Y satisfies ϵ-differential privacy (DP) if
for all neighboring databases x and x ′ that differ in one record,
and for any subset Y of the output range of the mechanism Y , it
holds that
P[Y (x) ∈ Y] ≤ eϵP[Y (x ′) ∈ Y]. (2)
To ensure ϵ-differential privacy, the Laplace mechanism [16] and
the exponential mechanism [28] have been proposed in the litera-
ture. e details are as follows.
• To achieve ϵ-differential privacy for a queryQ , the Laplacemech-
anism Lap(∆Q/ϵ) adds Laplace noise with parameter (i.e., scale)
∆Q/ϵ independently to each dimension of the query result, where
∆Q is the global sensitivity of query Q :
∆Q = maxneighboring x, x ′ ‖Q(x) − Q(x ′)‖1, where databases x
and x ′ are neighboring if they differ in one record.
• To ensure ϵ-differential privacy for a query Q , the exponential
mechanism Expo(ϵ,u,R) for some utility functionu and the out-
put range R outputs an element y ∈ R with probability propor-
tional to exp
( ϵ ·u(x,y)
2∆u
)
, where ∆u is the sensitivity of u with
respect to its database argument:
∆u = maxy∈R maxneighboring x, x ′ |u(x,y)−u(x ′,y)|, where data-
bases x and x ′ are neighboring if they differ in one record.
Althoughdifferential privacy (DP) has been recognized as a pow-
erful notion, it has been observed by Kifer and Machanavajjhala
[23] (see also [8, 20, 24, 26, 38, 44, 45]) that DP may not work as ex-
pectedwhen the data tuples are correlated. As noted by Zhao et al. [44],
although DP ensures that a user’s participation itself in the com-
putation reveals no further secrets from the user, however, due to
tuple correlation, a user’s data may impact other users’ records
and hence has more influence on the query response than what
is expected compared with the case where tuples are independent.
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When correlations exist, a user’s data is not known to the user
alone in some degree, and an adversary may combine the query
output and the correlation to learn about a user’s data.
To extend differential privacy for correlated data, prior studies
have investigated various privacymetrics [8, 20, 24, 26, 38, 45]. One
of the metrics receiving much aention is the notion of Bayesian
differential privacy introduced by Yang et al. [42] as follows.
2.3 Bayesian Differential Privacy
In this paper, wewill establish a connection of Bayesian differential
privacy to approximate max-information and then leverage this
connection to use Bayesian differential privacy for adaptive statis-
tical learning. We discuss Bayesian differential privacy below.
e notion of Bayesian differential privacy (BDP) is introduced
by Yang et al. [42] to extend differential privacy for addressing the
case when data records are correlated. Before stating the definition,
we first introduce some notation.
e database under consideration is modeled by a random vari-
able X = [X1,X2, . . . ,Xn ], where X j for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,n} is a tu-
ple, which is also a random variable. Let databasex = [x1, x2, . . . ,xn ]
be an instantiation of X , so that each xj denotes an instantiation
ofX j . Let i be the index of the tuple aacked by the adversary. For
notational simplicity, xS andXS stand for [xj : j ∈ S] and [X j : j ∈ S]
respectively for any set S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,n} \ {i}; i.e., xS is an instanti-
ation of XS . An adversary denoted by A(i,S) knows the values of
all tuples in S (denoted by xS ) and aempts to aack the value of
tuple i (denoted by xi ). For a randomized perturbation mechanism
Y that maps a database x to a randomized output y, the Bayesian
differential privacy leakage (BDPL) of Y with respect to the adver-
sary A(i,S) is defined by
BDPLA(Y ) = supxi ,x ′i,xS ,Y ln
P[y ∈ Y | xi , xS ]
P[y ∈ Y | x ′i ,xS ]
, (3)
where the subscriptA is short forA(i,S), and ln denotes the natural
logarithm. In (3), xi and x
′
i iterate through the domain of tuple Xi
(i.e., xi ∈ domain(Xi ), x ′i ∈ domain(Xi ), and xi , x ′i ), and xS
iterates through the domain of tuple(s) XS (i.e., xS ∈ domain(XS )),
where XS and xS stand for [X j : j ∈ S] and [xj : j ∈ S] respectively
for S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,n} \ {i}. In (3), Y iterates through all subsets of
the output range of the mechanism Y .
e mechanism Y satisfies ϵ-Bayesian differential privacy if
supABDPLA(Y ) ≤ ϵ . (4)
In (4), A (short for A(i, S)) iterates through the set of all adver-
saries; i.e., i iterates through the index set {1, . . . ,n} and S iterates
through all subsets of {1, 2, . . . ,n} \ {i}.
Based on (2)–(4), Yang et al. [42] show that when all tuples
are independent, (2) (i.e., DP guarantee) and (4) (i.e., BDP guar-
antee) are the same. However, under tuple correlations, (2) (i.e.,
DP guarantee) and (4) (i.e., BDP guarantee) are different due to the
following reason [44]: although DP protects the information re-
ceived from each user, an adversary may combine the correlations
and the query response to obtain a large amount of information
about the user. In other words, under DP, although the user itself
is privacy-aware in participating the database, the participations
of other users together with the query response nevertheless leak
the user’s data. e BDP notion ensures that even under tuple cor-
relation, almost no sensitive information about any user can be
leaked because of answering the query.
2.4 Mechanisms to Achieve Bayesian
Differential Privacy
Yang et al. [42] extend the Laplace mechanism [16] of differen-
tial privacy to achieve Bayesian differential privacy. However, this
mechanism of [42] is only for the sum query on a GaussianMarkov
random field (GMRF) with positive correlations and its extension
to a discrete domain, so it cannot apply to queries other than the
sum query and cannot apply to correlations other than those of
positive-correlatedGMRF. Recently, my co-authors and I [44] present
mechanisms for arbitrary correlations by connecting Bayesian dif-
ferential privacy (BDP) to differential privacy (DP). Specifically, we
[44] show that ϵ ′-DP implies ϵ-BDP, where ϵ ′ depends on ϵ and the
correlations between the data tuples. Note that although [44] uses
the notion of dependent differential privacy, this notion is equiva-
lent to Bayesian differential privacy.
For clarity, we will present [44]’s results on the relationship be-
tween Bayesian differential privacy (BDP) and differential privacy
(DP) as Lemmas 2–4 in Section 5.1 later. In order to state these re-
sults as well as our main results on adaptive statistical learning in
Section 3, we first review some preliminaries given in [44].
Representing dependency structure of tuples of a data-
base via probability graphical models. To represent depen-
dency structure of tuples in a database, we [44] apply the well-
known notion called probability graphicalmodel. ese models use
graphs (i.e., networks) to express the conditional (in)dependencies
between random variables. In our applications, each node stands
for a tuple of the database (a tuple is also a random variable), and
we have a network to represent the conditional (in)dependencies
between tuples of the database.
A Bayesian network (which is a directed acyclic graph) and a
Markov network (which is an undirected graph) are two kinds of
probability graphical models that have been studied extensively
and used in various applications [25]. A Bayesian network is a di-
rected acyclic graph which represents a factorization of the joint
probability of all random variables. Specifically, in a Bayesian net-
work of n nodes {X1,X2, . . . ,Xn}, with PAi denoting the set of
parents of node Xi (i.e., each node of PAi points directly to node
Xi via a single directed edge), then the joint probability satisfies
P [X1,X2, . . . ,Xn] =
∏n
i=1 P [Xi | PAi ]. A Markov network rep-
resents (in)dependencies between random variables via an undi-
rected graph which has the Markov property such that any two
subsets of variables are conditionally independent given a separat-
ing subset; i.e., with A,B,C denoting three disjoint sets of nodes,
if any path between any node a ∈ A and any node b ∈ B has to
include at least one node in C (or there is simply no path between
a ∈ A and b ∈ B), then A and B are conditionally independent
given C .
Markov blanket. e notion of Markov blanket is standard in
probability graphical models [25]. For a node Xi , its Markov blan-
ketXMi comprises the tuples that are directly correlated with tuple
Xi (i.e., given XMi which contains X j for j ∈ Mi , Xi is condition-
ally independent of everything else). If Xi is independent of all
3
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Figure 1: is figure from [44] is based on [38]. For a Markov chain X1 → X2 . . . → Xn , moralization simply means making
each directed edge undirected, since there are no nodes that have a common child. A Markov quilt for node Xi is XQi =
{Xi−a,Xi+b }. e corresponding nearby set XNi and remote set XRi are XNi = {Xi−a+1, . . . ,Xi−1} ∪ {Xi+1, . . . ,Xi+b−1} and XRi =
{X1, . . . ,Xi−a−1} ∪ {Xi+b+1, . . . ,Xn}. To check the definition of a Markov quilt, it is straightforward to see that here any path
between Xi and a node in XRi has to include at least one node in XQi . Both a and b above are positive integers. If a = 1 and
b = 1, the Markov quilt becomes the Markov blanket XMi = {Xi−1,Xi+1} with the corresponding XNi being ∅. Note that any X
term with an index outside of {1, 2, . . . ,n} is canceled out; e.g., the Markov blanket XM1 of node X1 is actually {X2} rather than
{X0,X2} since there is no node X0.
other n − 1 tuples, then Mi = ∅. In a Bayesian network, a node’s
Markov blanket consists of its parents, children, and its children’s
other parents. In a Markov network (also known as a Markov ran-
dom field), the Markov blanket of a node is its set of neighboring
nodes.
Markov quilt. We [44] generalize the notion of Markov blan-
ket toMarkov quilt. is definition is adopted from Song et al. [38]
with slight changes. We consider a network ofn nodesX1,X2, . . . ,Xn .
First, we perform moralization if necessary. In other words, for a
Bayesian network, we moralize it into a Markov network; for a
Markov network, no action is taken. Moralization means making
each directed edge undirected and puing an edge between any
two nodes that have a common child. Recall thatXS represents the
set of nodes with indicies in an index set S , where S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,n};
i.e. XS = {X j : j ∈ S}. Let Qi and Ri be disjoint subsets of
{1, 2, . . . ,n} \ {i}. We say a set XQi of nodes is a Markov quilt of
node Xi if aer moralization (whenever necessary) of the depen-
dency network, for any nodeX j inXRi , either any path betweenXi
andX j has to include at least one node inXQi , or there is simply no
path between Xi and X j . We emphasize that this definition is de-
fined on a Markov network or aer we have moralized a Bayesian
network into a Markov network. e definition implies that XRi
is independent of Xi conditioning on XQi . Excluding Xi , XQi and
XRi , we define the remaining nodes as XNi ; i.e., XQi , XNi , XRi to-
gether constitute a partition of
{
X j : j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,n} \ {i}
}
so that
Qi ,Ri ,Ni together partition {1, 2, . . . ,n}\{i}. Intuitively, XQi sep-
arates Xi and XRi , so XRi is remote from Xi while XNi is nearby
from Xi (this is why we use the notation R and N ). We refer to
XNi (resp., XRi ) as the nearby set (resp., the remote set) associated
with the Markov quilt XQi . Note that when we define a Markov
quilt XQi for node Xi , we actually have a triple (XQi ,XNi ,XRi ): a
Markov quilt XQi , a nearby set XNi , and a remote set XRi . Figure 1
provides an illustration of XQi , XRi , and XNi on a Markov chain.
Clearly, for a node, its Markov blanket is a special Markov quilt.
Yet, while a node has only one Markov blanket, a node may have
many different Markov quilts, as presented in Figure 1.
Max-influence. To quantify how much changing a tuple can
impact other tuples, very recently, Song et al. [38] define themax-influence
of a variable Xi on a set of variables XS (i.e., the set of X j for j ∈ S)
for S ⊆ {1, . . . ,n} \ {i} as follows:
I(XS f Xi ) def= ln max
xS ,xi,x
′
i
{
P [xS | xi ]/P
[
xS | x
′
i
]}
. (5)
We [44] generalize this definition to describe the max-influence of
Xi on a set of variables XS conditioning on a set of variables XK as
follows (S and K are disjoint subsets of {1, . . . ,n} \ {i}):
I(XS f Xi | XK ) def= ln max
xS ,xi,x
′
i,xK
{
P [xS | xi ,xK ]/P
[
xS | x
′
i ,xK
]}
.
(6)
In (5) and (6), XS and xS stand for [X j : j ∈ S] and [xj : j ∈ S]
respectively for S ⊆ {1, . . . ,n} \ {i}; similarly, XK and xK stand
for [X j : j ∈ K] and [xj : j ∈ K] respectively forK ⊆ {1, . . . ,n}\{i}.
We also have that S andK are disjoint subsets of {1, . . . ,n}\{i}); xi
and x ′i iterate through the domain of tupleXi (i.e., xi ∈ domain(Xi ),
x ′i ∈ domain(Xi ), and xi , x ′i ); xS iterates through the domain of
tuple(s) XS (i.e., xS ∈ domain(XS )); and xK iterates through the
domain of tuple(s) XK (i.e., xK ∈ domain(XK )).
Based on (6), I(XS f Xi | XK ) equals 0 if and only if XS is
independent of Xi conditioning on XK , given the following:
• On the one hand, if XS is independent of Xi conditioning on
XK , then the nominator P [xS | xi ,xK ] and the denominator
P
[
xS | x
′
i , xK
]
in (6) are the same, so I(XS f Xi | XK ) be-
comes 0.
• On the other hand,I(XS f Xi | XK ) equals 0 only ifP [xS | xi , xK ]
= P
[
xS | x
′
i ,xK
]
for any xi , any x
′
i , any xS , and any xK (i.e.,
only if XS is independent of Xi conditioning on XK ).
In (6), we note that S andK are disjoint subsets of {1, . . . ,n}\{i}.
Also, for generality, if S = ∅, then I(XS f Xi | XK ) = 0.
3 THE RESULTS
Our algorithm for adaptive statistical learning with correlated sam-
ples is presented as Algorithm 1 (based on [12]), which tackles
adaptive queriesQ1,Q2, . . ., eachwith global sensitivity upper bounded
by ∆Q . e queries Q1,Q2, . . . are chosen adaptively based on the
results of prior estimates. We use Algorithm 1 to enable validation
of an analyst’s queries in the adaptive seing. Aswill become clear,
Algorithm 1 is ϵ-differential private for ϵ = B∆Q ×
( 1
σ +
1
σ2
+
2
σ3
)
=
9B∆Q
4σ and thus is ϵ
′-Bayesian differential private for ϵ ′ defined
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Algorithm 1Ageneralization-achieving algorithm (based on [12])
for adaptive queriesQ1,Q2, . . ., each with global sensitivity upper
bounded by ∆Q .
Input: Holdout datasetX , training dataset D, noise rate σ , budget
B, thresholdT , queriesQ1,Q2, . . .
Output: A stream of answers
1: let σ2 ← 4σ , and σ3 ← 2σ ;
2: let T̂ ← T +Lap(σ ); {Comment: Lap(σ )means sampling a fresh
Laplace noise with parameter (i.e., scale) σ .}
3: for each query Qi do
4: if B < 1 then
5: output “⊥”;
6: else
7: let γi ← Lap(σ3);
8: if |Qi (X ) −Qi (D)| + γi > T̂ then
9: let B ← B − 1 and T̂ ← T + Lap(σ );
10: output Qi (X ) + Lap(σ2);
11: else
12: output Qi (D);
13: end if
14: end if
15: end for
in Lemma 2 or Lemma 3 on Page 6 later with the above ϵ . For an un-
known distribution D over a discrete universe X of possible data
points, a statistical query Q asks for the expected value of some
function f : X → [0, 1] on random draws from D. It follows that
∆Q = 1/n for a statistical query [3, 12, 13].
Theorem 1. Let β , τ ,σ ,B,T > 0. Let X = [X1,X2, . . . ,Xn] de-
note the holdout dataset drawn randomly from a distributionP . Con-
sider an analyst that is given access to the training dataset D and se-
lects statistical queries Q1,Q2, . . . adaptively while interacting with
Algorithm 1 which is given holdout dataset X , training dataset D,
noise rate σ , budget B, threshold T . If
n ≥ n∗(B,σ , τ , β)
def
= max
{
9 ln(4/β)
τ 2
, max
i ∈{1, ...,n }
9B
4σ · (τ/3 − 4ai )
}
, (7)
or
n ≥ n#(B,σ , τ , β)
def
= max
{
9 ln(4/β)
τ 2
, max
i ∈{1, ...,n }
min
Markov quilt XQi of Xi
9B · (|Ni | + 1)
4σ · (τ/3 − 4bi )
}
,
(8)
then for arbitrary correlations between data samples, we have
P [|Qi (X ) −Qi (P)| ≥ τ ] ≤ β for every i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, (9)
where ai
def
= I(XMi f Xi ) = ln max
xi,x
′
i,xMi
P[xMi |xi ]
P[xMi |x ′i ] withXMi being
the Markov blanket of Xi , and bi
def
= max
L⊆Ni
I(XQi f Xi | XL) for
I(XQi f Xi | XL)
def
= max
L⊆Ni
ln max
xQi ,xi,x
′
i,xL
P[xQi |xi,xL]
P[xQi |x ′i,xL] . In the
expression of ai , the records xi and x
′
i iterate through the domain of
tuple Xi (i.e., xi ∈ domain(Xi ), x ′i ∈ domain(Xi ), and xi , x ′i ), and
xMi iterates through the domain of tuple(s) XMi with XMi being the
Markov blanket of Xi . In n#(·) of (8), note that we can letXQi iterate
through just an arbitrary set containing some Markov quilts of Xi ,
rather than iterating through the set of all Markov quilts of Xi , since
leingXQi iterate a smaller set can only induce a larger (or the same)
bound in (8). In addition, as explained on Page 4, when we define a
Markov quiltXQi for nodeXi , the nearby setXNi is also determined;
i.e., Ni is also determined. Given Ni , the set L in the definition of bi
iterates all subsets ofNi . In the expression ofI(XQi f Xi | XL), the
records xi and x
′
i iterate through the domain of tuple Xi (i.e., xi ∈
domain(Xi ), x ′i ∈ domain(Xi ), and xi , x ′i ), xQi iterates through
the domain of tuple(s) XQi , and xL iterates through the domain of
tuple(s) XL .
eorem 1 will be proved in Section 5.2. We now apply our
results above to analyze the entire execution of Algorithm 1.
Theorem 2. Let β ,τ > 0 andm ≥ B > 0. Set σ = (1−c)τ
12 ln(4m/β )
and T =
(1+c)τ
2 for an arbitrary constant c ∈ (0, 1). For every i =
1, 2, . . . ,m, let ai be the answer of Algorithm1 on statistical queryQi ,
and define the counter of overfiingZi
def
=
{j ≤ i : |Qj (D) −Qj (P)| ≥ cτ }.
en for arbitrary correlations between data samples, we have
P
[
∃i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} : Zi < B and|ai −Qi (P)| ≥ τ
]
≤ β ,
for
n≥ n#
(
B,
(1−c)τ
12 ln(4m/β ) ,
(1−c)τ
4 ,
β
2m
)
= O
(
B ln m
β
· max
i ∈{1, ...,n }
min
Markov quilt XQi of Xi
|Ni |+1
τ ·(τ /3−4bi )
)
,
where n#(·) is defined in (8) of eorem 1. When the correlations be-
tween data samples are represented by a time-homogeneous Markov
chain that is also aperiodic, irreducible and reversible, the above con-
dition on n becomes n ≥ O ( B ln(1/τ )
τ 2
· ln m
β
)
.
eorem 2will be proved in Section 5.3. eorems 1 and 2 above
generalize recent results of Dwork et al. [12] to the case of corre-
lated data. eorem 25 of [12] presents the sample complexity for
i.i.d. data samples asO
( B
τ 2
× ln m
β
)
, while our eorem 2 gives the
sample complexity as O
( B ln(1/τ )
τ 2
× ln m
β
)
when the correlations
between data samples are modeled by a Markov chain, by intro-
ducing just a small additional expense (i.e., the factor ln(1/τ )).
We present in eorem 3 below that ϵ-Bayesian differential pri-
vacy implies a bound on approximate max-information.
Theorem 3. Let X = [X1,X2, . . . ,Xn ] be the statistical data-
base under consideration, and Y be an ϵ-Bayesian differential pri-
vate algorithm. en for any β > 0, it holds that I
β
∞(X ;Y (X )) ≤(
2ϵ2n + ϵ
√
2n ln(2/β) ) loge , where logmeans the binary logarithm.
eorem 3 will be proved in Appendix A.1 on Page 11. eo-
rem 19 of Dwork et al. [12] give a simple bound ϵn loge that is
weaker than that of our eorem 3. In Appendix A.2 on Page 12,
we will use eorem 3 above to obtain the following Lemma 1 on
generalization bounds.
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Figure 2: Reusing a holdout dataset in the common way can
lead to overfitting.
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Figure 3: Overfitting of reusing a holdout dataset is pre-
vented in our Bayesian differential privacy-based approach.
Lemma 1. LetX be a random database chosen according to distri-
bution P , and Y be an ϵ-Bayesian differential private algorithm for
query Q with global sensitivity ∆Q . Let Y (P) be the expectation of
Y (X ). If ϵ ≤ τ/(3n∆Q ), thenP [|Y (X ) − Y (P)| ≥ τ ] ≤ 4e−τ 2/(9n ·∆Q 2).
From Lemma 1, for a statistical query [3, 12, 13] with ∆Q = 1/n,
if ϵ ≤ τ/3, then P [|Y (X ) − Y (P)| ≥ τ ] ≤ 4e−τ 2n/9.
We use Lemma 1 in the proofs of eorems 1 and 2 for quanti-
fying the number of samples needed to bound the generalization
error.
4 EXPERIMENTS OF ADAPTIVE
STATISTICAL LEARNING
We provide experiments on synthetic data to support our result of
adaptive statistical learning that reuses a holdout dataset with tu-
ple correlations. e goal of the analyst is build a linear threshold
classifier, which is the same as [12]. We do not repeat the details
of the classifier of [12] here. e label is randomly selected from
{−1, 1} and the aributes are generated such that they are corre-
lated with the label and also correlated among themselves. Figures
2 and 3 illustrate that reusing a holdout dataset in the commonway
can lead to overfiing, and that overfiing is prevented by our ap-
proach based on Bayesian differential privacy (BDP).
5 PROOFS
5.1 Useful Lemmas
Below we state several lemmas that will be used later to prove the
theorems. Lemmas 2 and 3 below present the relationship between
Bayesian differential privacy (BDP) and differential privacy (DP)
when the tuple correlations can be arbitrary. Lemma 4 provides
the corresponding result when the tuple correlations are modeled
by a time-homogeneous Markov chain.
Lemma 2 ([44]). For a database with arbitrary tuple correlations,
it holds that
ϵ-Bayesian differential privacy ⇐= ϵ ′-differential privacy
for ϵ ′ = min
i ∈{1,2, ...,n }
max
XQi : a Markov quilt of Xi
XNi : the nearby set associated with XQi
ϵ − 4bi
|Ni | + 1
,
(10)
where bi
def
= max
L⊆Ni
I(XQi f Xi | XL), the meanings of a Markov
quilt and its associated nearby set have been elaborated on Page 4,
andXQi in (10) can iterate through the set of all Markov quilts of Xi ,
or just an arbitrary set containing some Markov quilts of Xi . Note
that we can let XQi iterate through just an arbitrary set containing
some Markov quilts of Xi , rather than iterating through the set of
all Markov quilts of Xi , since (i) based on (10), leing XQi iterate a
smaller set cannot make ϵ ′ larger (i.e., it either induces a smaller ϵ ′
or does not change ϵ ′), and (ii) ϵ∗-differential privacy with a smaller
ϵ∗ implies ϵ#-differential privacy with a larger ϵ#. In addition, as
explained on Page 4, when we define a Markov quilt XQi for node
Xi , the nearby set XNi is also determined; i.e., Ni is also determined.
Given Ni , the set L in the definition of bi iterates all subsets of Ni .
Lemma 3 ([44]). Leing XQi in (10) take just the Markov blanket
of Xi since the Markov blanket is a special case of the Markov quilt
as discussed on Page 4, we can replace (10) by
ϵ-Bayesian differential privacy ⇐= ϵ ′-differential privacy
for ϵ ′ = min
i ∈{1,2, ...,n }
(ϵ − 4ai ),
where ai
def
= I(XMi f Xi ) = ln max
xi ,x
′
i,xMi
P[xMi |xi ]
P[xMi |x ′i ] .
Lemma 4 ([44]). Consider a database with tuples modeled by a
time-homogeneous Markov chain X1 → X2 → . . . → Xn that
is also aperiodic, irreducible and reversible. For this Markov chain,
let д be the spectral gap of the transition matrix; i.e., д equals 1 −
max{|λ2 |, |λ3 |, . . . , |λn |} with the eigenvalues of the transition ma-
trix in non-increasing order being λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ . . . ≥ λn , where λ1 = 1.
Let ρ be the probability of the least probable state in the stationary
distribution of the Markov chain; i.e., ρ equalsminj∈S d j with vector
[d j : j ∈ S] denoting the stationary distribution and S denoting the
state space. Let c be an arbitrary constant satisfying 0 < c < 1/6.
With d
def
=
⌈
1
д ln
ecϵ+1
ρ (ecϵ−1)
⌉
, t
def
=
⌊
1
д ln
1
ρ
⌋
and ξt+1
def
=
e−д(t+1)
ρ , then
for n ≥ 2d , ϵ-Bayesian differential privacy is implied by h(ϵ,д, ρ)-
differential privacy, where
h(ϵ,д, ρ) def= min
{
(1 − 6c)ϵ
2d − 1 ,
( 13 − 2c)ϵ
d + s
}
. (11)
5.2 Proof of eorem 1 on Page 5
For an unknown distributionD over a discrete universe X of pos-
sible data points, a statistical query Q asks for the expected value
of some function f : X → [0, 1] on random draws from D. On
a database of n records, the global sensitivity of a statistical query
Q is ∆Q = 1/n. Substituting ∆Q = 1/n into Lemma 1 on Page 6,
we obtain that under ϵ-Bayesian differential privacy, if ϵ ≤ τ/3,
6
then P [|Y (X ) − Y (P)| ≥ τ ] ≤ 4e−τ 2n/9. Hence, to induce the de-
sired P [|Qi (X ) −Qi (P)| ≥ τ ] ≤ β in eorem 1, we ensure ϵ ≤
τ/3 and 4e−τ 2n/9 ≤ β . From [12, 17], Algorithm 1 on Page 5 is ϵ∗-
differential private for ϵ∗ = B∆Q ·
( 1
σ +
1
σ2
+
2
σ3
)
=
9B∆Q
4σ . e above
result and Lemma 2 together imply that Algorithm 1 is ϵ-Bayesian
differential private forϵ = min
i ∈{1, ...,n }
max
Markov quilt XQi of Xi
9B∆Q
4σ −4bi
|Ni |+1 .
en ∆Q = 1/n and the condition ϵ ≤ τ/3 imply
n ≥ max
i ∈{1, ...,n }
min
Markov quilt XQi of Xi
9B ·( |Ni |+1)
4σ ·(τ /3−4bi ) . (12)
In addition, the condition 4e−τ 2n/9 ≤ β implies
n ≥ 9 ln(4/β )
τ 2
. (13)
en with n#(B,σ , τ , β) defined as the maximum of the right hand
sides of (12) and (13), we obtain that n ≥ n#(B,σ , τ , β) suffices. We
can also apply Lemma 3 instead of Lemma 2. In this case, (12) is
replaced by
n ≥ max
i ∈{1, ...,n }
9B
4σ ·(τ /3−4ai ) ,
which together with (13) implies that n ≥ n∗(B,σ , τ , β) suffices.
5.3 Proof of eorem 2 on Page 5
We prove eorem 2 using the technique similar to that of [12,
eorem 25]. For notation convenience in the analysis, we write
“T̂ ← T + Lap(σ )” in Lines 2 and 9 of Algorithm 1 as “T̂ ← T +
δi ”, where δi denotes Lap(σ ); i.e., δi is a fresh Laplace noise with
parameter (i.e., scale) σ . Also, we writeQi (X )+ Lap(σ2) in Line 10
of Algorithm 1 as Qi (X ) + ξi , where ξi denotes Lap(σ2); i.e., ξi is
a fresh Laplace noise with parameter σ2. With the above changes,
we restate Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 (Restated). A generalization-achieving algorithm
(based on [12]) for adaptive queries Q1,Q2, . . ., each with global
sensitivity upper bounded by ∆Q .
Input: Holdout set X , training set D, noise rate σ , budget B,
threshold T , queries Q1,Q2, . . .
Output: A stream of answers
1: let σ2 ← 4σ , and σ3 ← 2σ ;
2: let T̂ ← T +δi , where δi ← Lap(σ ); {Comment: Lap(σ )means
sampling a fresh Laplace noise with parameter (i.e., scale) σ .}
3: for each query Qi do
4: if B < 1 then
5: output “⊥”;
6: else
7: let γi ← Lap(σ3);
8: if |Qi (X ) −Qi (D)| + γi > T̂ then
9: let B ← B − 1 and T̂ ← T + δi , where δi ← Lap(σ );
10: output Qi (X ) + ξi , where ξi ← Lap(σ2);
11: else
12: output Qi (D);
13: end if
14: end if
15: end for
Recall that ai denotes the answer of Algorithm 1 on statistical
queryQi . In the result that we desire to prove, we bound the error
between ai and Qi (P). is error can be decomposed as the differ-
ence between ai andQi (X ), and the difference betweenQi (X ) and
Qi (P). More specifically, it holds that
P [ai ,⊥ &|ai −Qi (P)| ≥ τ ]
=P
[
ai,⊥ &|ai−Qi (X )|≥ 3 + c
4
τ
]
+P
[
|Qi (P)−Qi (X )|≥ 1 − c
4
τ
]
.
(14)
A more formal reasoning that uses the union bound to establish
(14) is presented below, whereAmeans the complement of eventA.
We have
P [ai ,⊥ &|ai −Qi (P)| ≥ τ ]
=P
[
ai =⊥ or |ai −Qi (P)| < τ
]
≤P
[(
ai=⊥ or |ai−Qi (X )|< 3 + c
4
τ
)
&
(
|Qi (P)−Qi (X )|< 1 − c
4
τ
)]
=P
[
ai =⊥ or |ai−Qi (X )|< 3 + c
4
τ or |Qi (P)−Qi (X )|< 1 − c
4
τ
]
≤P
[
ai=⊥ or |ai−Qi (X )|< 3 + c
4
τ
]
+P
[
|Qi (P)−Qi (X )|< 1 − c
4
τ
]
=P
[
ai ,⊥ &|ai−Qi (X )|≥ 3 + c
4
τ
]
+P
[
|Qi (P)−Qi (X )|≥ 1 − c
4
τ
]
.
(15)
To bound the second term in (15), we use eorem 1 to obtain
for every i : P
[
|Qi (P) −Qi (X )| ≥ 1 − c
4
τ
]
≤ β
2m
(16)
if n ≥ n#
(
B,σ ,
(1 − c)τ
4
,
β
2m
)
.
where “for every i” means “i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}” (note thatm is the num-
ber of queries answered). en (16) and the union bound together
imply
P
[
∃i : |Qi (P) −Qi (X )| ≥ 1 − c
4
τ
]
≤ β
2
(17)
if n ≥ n#
(
B,σ ,
(1 − c)τ
4
,
β
2m
)
,
where “∃i” means “∃i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}”.
Below we bound the first term in (15) by analyzing Algorithm
1. For the answer ai that is different from ⊥, we bound the first
term in (15) by considering two cases of Algorithm 1. First, if Line
10 of Algorithm 1 is executed, then ai = Qi (X ) + ξi and thus |ai −
Qi (X )| = |ξi |. Second, if Line 12 of Algorithm 1 is executed, then
|Qi (X ) −Qi (D)| + γi ≤ T̂ and ai = Qi (D), yielding |ai −Qi (X )| =
|Qi (D)−Qi (X )| ≤ T̂−γi = T+δi−γi and furthermore |ai−Qi (X )| ≤
7
T + |δi | + |γi |. Summarizing the two cases above, we obtain
P
[
∃i : ai ,⊥ & |ai −Qi (X )| ≥ 3 + c
4
· τ
]
≤ max
{
P
[
∃i : |ξi | ≥ 3 + c
4
τ
]
, P
[
∃i : |δi | + |γi | ≥ 3 + c
4
τ −T
]}
≤ max
{
P
[
∃i : |ξi | ≥ 3 + c
4
τ
]
, P
[
∃i : |δi | + |γi | ≥ 1 − c
4
τ
]}
,
(18)
where the last step uses T =
(1+c)τ
2 .
Since ξi obeys a Laplace distribution with parameter 4σ , where
σ
def
=
(1−c)τ
12 ln(4m/β ) from the condition, it holds that
for every i : P
[
|ξi | ≥ 3 + c
4
τ
]
= exp
{
−
3+c
4 · τ
4σ
}
≤ β
4m
, (19)
where the last step uses 3+c16 ≥ 1−c12 . en (19) and the union bound
yield
P
[
∃i : |ξi | ≥ 3 + c
4
τ
]
≤ β
4
. (20)
To bound P
[
∃i : |δi | + |γi | ≥ 1−c4 τ
]
, we use the union bound to
derive
P
[
∃i : |δi | + |γi | ≥ 1 − c
4
τ
]
= P
[
∀i : |δi | + |γi | < 1 − c
4
τ
]
≤ P
[(
∀i : |δi | < 1 − c
12
τ
)
&
(
∀i : |γi | < 1 − c
6
τ
)]
= P
[(
∀i : |δi | < 1 − c
12
τ
)
or
(
∀i : |γi | < 1 − c
6
τ
) ]
≤ P
[(
∀i : |δi | < 1 − c
12
τ
)]
+ P
[(
∀i : |γi | < 1 − c
6
τ
) ]
= P
[
∃i : |δi | ≥ 1 − c
12
τ
]
+ P
[
∃i : |γi | ≥ 1 − c
6
τ
]
. (21)
Since δi obeys a Laplace distribution with parameter σ , and γi
obeys a Laplace distribution with parameter 2σ , then given σ =
(1−c)τ
12 ln(4m/β ) , we obtain
for every i : P
[
|δi | ≥ 1 − c
12
· τ
]
= exp
{
−
1−c
12 · τ
σ
}
=
β
4m
(22)
and
for every i : P
[
|γi | ≥ 1 − c
6
· τ
]
= exp
{
−
1−c
6 · τ
2σ
}
=
β
4m
. (23)
en using the union bound together with (22) and (23), we have
P
[
∃i : |δi | ≥ 1 − c
12
· τ
]
= exp
{
−
1−c
12 · τ
σ
}
=
β
4
(24)
and
P
[
∃i : |γi | ≥ 1 − c
6
· τ
]
= exp
{
−
1−c
6 · τ
2σ
}
=
β
4
. (25)
Applying (24) and (25) to (21), we derive
P
[
∃i : |δi | + |γi | ≥ 1 − c
4
τ
]
≤ β
2
. (26)
Substituting (20) and (26) into (18), we obtain
P
[
∃i : ai ,⊥ & |ai −Qi (X )| ≥ 3 + c
4
· τ
]
≤ β
2
. (27)
Using (17) and (27) in (15), we have
P [∃i : ai ,⊥ & |ai −Qi (P)| ≥ τ ] ≤ β . (28)
if n ≥ n#
(
B,σ ,
(1 − c)τ
4
,
β
2m
)
.
To complete the proof, we will show that Zi < B is a subevent of
ai ,⊥ (i.e., if Zi < B then ai ,⊥) so that
P [∃i : Zi < B & |ai −Qi (P)| ≥ τ ]
≤ P [∃i : ai ,⊥ & |ai −Qi (P)| ≥ τ ] ,
whereZi
def
=
{j ≤ i : |Qj (D)−Qj (P)| ≥ cτ } denotes the counter of
overfiing. For every j ≤ i that reduces the budget B in Algorithm
1 (i.e., Line 9 of Algorithm 1 is executed), it follows that
|Qj (D) −Qj (P)| ≥ |Qj (X ) −Qj (D)| − |Qj (P) −Qj (X )|
≥ |T̂ − γj | − |Qj (P) −Qj (X )|
≥ |T + δ j − γj | − |Qj (P) −Qj (X )|
≥ T − |δ j | − |γj | − |Qj (P) −Qj (X )|. (29)
en applying T = 1+c2 τ , |δ j | < 1−c12 τ , |γj | < 1−c6 τ and |Qj (P) −
Qj (X )| < 1−c4 τ to (29), we find
|Qj (D) −Qj (P)| ≥ 1 + c
2
τ − 1 − c
12
τ − 1 − c
6
τ − 1 − c
4
τ = cτ .
Hence, if Zi < B, then the budget B in Algorithm 1 is still at least
1, and hence ai ,⊥. is along with (28) implies that
P [∃i : ai ,⊥ & |ai −Qi (P)| ≥ τ ] ≤ β .
if n ≥ n#
(
B,σ ,
(1 − c)τ
4
,
β
2m
)
. (30)
Given the conditionσ =
(1−c)τ
12 ln(4m/β ) andn#(·) defined ineorem 1,
we obtain from (30) that
n ≥ n#
(
B,
(1 − c)τ
12 ln(4m/β) ,
(1 − c)τ
4
,
β
2m
)
= max

9 ln(4/β )
τ 2
,
max
i ∈{1, ...,n }
min
Markov quilt XQi of Xi
9B ·( |Ni |+1)
4· (1−c )τ12 ln(4m/β ) ·(τ /3−4bi )

= O
(
B ln m
β
· max
i ∈{1, ...,n }
min
Markov quilt XQi of Xi
|Ni |+1
τ ·(τ /3−4bi )
)
.
(31)
Hence, we have proved the result for arbitrary correlations be-
tween data samples in eorem 2. Now we establish the result of
in eorem 2 when the Markov chain represents the correlations
between data samples: on a time-homogeneous Markov chain that
is also aperiodic, irreducible and reversible, the condition on n in
8
(31) becomes n = O
( B ln(1/τ )
τ 2
· ln m
β
)
. To this end, given (31), then
with ϵ being τ/3, we will evaluate
max
i ∈{1, ...,n }
min
Markov quilt XQi of Xi
|Ni |+1
ϵ−4bi . (32)
As shown in Lemma 2 on Page 6 above, ϵ-Bayesian differential
privacy is implied by ϵ ′-differential privacy, for
ϵ ′ def= min
i ∈{1, ...,n }
max
Markov quilt XQi of Xi
ϵ−4bi
|Ni |+1 . en the term in (32)
equals 1/ϵ ′. e above result holds because for any sequence si ,
we can write 1max si as min
1
si
, and write 1min si as max
1
si
. On a
time-homogeneous Markov chain X1 → X2 → . . . → Xn that is
also aperiodic, irreducible and reversible, the quantity ρ > 0 is the
probability of the least probable state in the stationary distribution
of theMarkov chain; i.e., ρ equalsminj∈S d j with vector [d j : j ∈ S]
denoting the stationary distribution and S denoting the state space.
e term д is the spectral gap of the transition matrix; i.e., д equals
1−max{|λ2 |, |λ3 |, . . . , |λn |} with the eigenvalues of the transition
matrix in non-increasing order being λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ . . . ≥ λn , where
λ1 = 1. en Lemma 4 on Page 6 above shows that ϵ
′ above can
be replaced by h(ϵ,д, ρ) as follows:
h(ϵ,д, ρ) def= min
{
(1 − 6c)ϵ
2d − 1 ,
( 13 − 2c)ϵ
d + s
}
, (33)
where d
def
=
⌈
1
д ln
ecϵ+1
ρ (ecϵ−1)
⌉
and s
def
=
⌊
1
д ln
eϵ/6+1
ρ (eϵ/6−1)
⌋
. We further
prove that 1/[h(ϵ,д, ρ)] = O ( 1τ ln 1τ ) follows. Clearly, we obtain
d ≤ 1
д
ln
ecϵ + 1
ρ(ecϵ − 1) + 1 =
1
д
ln
(
1 +
2
ecϵ − 1
)
+
1
д
ln
1
ρ
+ 1 (34)
and
s ≤ 1
д
ln
eϵ/6 + 1
ρ(eϵ/6 − 1) =
1
д
ln
(
1 +
2
eϵ/6 − 1
)
+
1
д
ln
1
ρ
. (35)
Given ϵ = τ/3, 0 < τ ≤ 1, 0 < c < 1/6, we have cϵ < ϵ/6 ≤
τ/18 ≤ 1/18, implying ecϵ < eϵ/6 ≤ e1/18. en it holds that
2
ecϵ−1 >
2
eϵ/6−1 ≥
2
e1/18−1 > 1. Since ln(1 + a) ≤ ln(2a) holds for
a ≥ 1, we further obtain ln(1 + 2ecϵ−1 ) ≤ ln 4ecϵ−1 ≤ ln 4cϵ = ln 12cτ
and ln(1 + 2
eϵ/6−1 ) ≤ ln
4
eϵ/6−1 ≤ ln
4
ϵ/6 = ln
24
ϵ = ln
72
τ . e
application of these to (34) and (35) yields
d ≤ 1
д
ln
12
cτ
+
1
д
ln
1
ρ
+ 1 (36)
and
s ≤ 1
д
ln
72
τ
+
1
д
ln
1
ρ
. (37)
Using (36) and (37) in (33), we get
h(ϵ,д, ρ) def= min
{
(1 − 6c)ϵ
2d − 1 ,
( 13 − 2c)ϵ
d + s
}
≥ min
{
(1 − 6c) · τ/3
2
д ln
12
cρ +
2
д ln
1
τ + 1
,
( 13 − 2c) · τ/3
1
д ln
12
cρ +
1
д ln
1
τ + 1 +
1
д ln
72
ρ +
1
д ln
1
τ
}
,
which further implies
1
h(ϵ,д, ρ) ≤ min
{ 2
д ln
12
cρ +
2
д ln
1
τ + 1
(1 − 6c) · τ/3 ,
1
д ln
12
cρ +
1
д ln
1
τ + 1 +
1
д ln
72
ρ +
1
д ln
1
τ
( 13 − 2c) · τ/3
}
. (38)
Ignoring the constants in (38), we have
1
h(ϵ,д, ρ) = O
(
1
τ
ln
1
τ
)
. (39)
As noted,h(ϵ,д, ρ) is a lower boundof ϵ ′, which implies that 1/[h(ϵ,д, ρ)]
is an upper bound of 1/ϵ ′ (i.e., the term in (32)). en from (39),
the term in (32) can be expressed as O
( 1
τ ln
1
τ
)
. From ϵ = τ/3,
this means that n specified in (31) becomes n = O
( B ln(1/τ )
τ 2
· ln m
β
)
.
Hence, the proof of eorem 2 is now completed.
6 RELATED WORK
Inmany practical applications, statistical learning is oen adaptive—
the queries on a dataset depend on previous interactions with the
same dataset. However, generalization guarantees are tradition-
ally given in a non-adaptive model. Recent studies by Hardt and
Ullman [19] as well as Dwork et al. [12–14] provide generalization
bounds in adaptive statistical learning, while Dwork et al. [12–14]
also proposemechanisms via differential privacy andmax-information.
Differential privacy means that an adversary given access to the
output does not have much confidence to determine whether the
output was sampled from the probability distribution generated
by the algorithm under a database x or under a neighboring data-
base x ′ that differs from x in one record. Specifically, a randomized
algorithm Y satisfies ϵ-differential privacy if for all neighboring
databases x , x ′ and any subsetY of the ouput range of the mecha-
nism Y , it holds that P [Y (x) ∈ Y] ≤ eϵP [Y (x ′) ∈ Y] .e notion
of max-information gives generalization since it upper bounds the
probability of “bad events” that can occur as a result of the depen-
dence of the output variable Y (X ) on the input variable X .
Rogers et al. [33] show the connection between approximate dif-
ferential privacy and max-information, and prove that the connec-
tion holds only for data drawn from product distributions, where
approximate differential privacy (ADP) [15] relaxes differential pri-
vacy so that (ϵ, δ )-ADP means the probabilities that the same out-
put is seen on neighboring databases x and x ′ (differing in one
record) is bounded by a factor eϵ , in addition to a small additive
probability δ ; i.e., P [Y (x) ∈ Y] ≤ eϵP [Y (x ′) ∈ Y]+ δ for any sub-
set Y of the ouput range of the mechanism Y . Very recently, Bass-
ily and Freund [3] propose an algorithmic stability notion called
typical stability which provides generalization for a broader class
of queries than that of bounded-sensitivity queries (bounded sen-
sitivity is oen required by differential privacy). Typical stability
means that the output of a query is “well-concentrated” around
its expectation with respect to the underlying distribution on the
dataset. Cummings et al. [10] introduce different generalization
notions and discuss their relationships with differential privacy.
Russo and Zou [34] present a mutual-information framework for
adaptive statistical learning and compare it with max-information.
Blum and Hardt [5] design an algorithm to maintain an accurate
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leaderboard for machine learning competitions (such as those or-
ganized by Kaggle Inc. at hp://www.kaggle.com/ ), where submis-
sions can be adaptive.
Since differential privacywas proposed to quantify privacy anal-
ysis [11, 16], this notion has received much aention in the litera-
ture [4, 22, 32, 37, 39]. Kifer and Machanavajjhala [23] observe that
differential privacy may not work well when the data tuples are
correlated in between. To generalize differential privacy, Kifer and
Machanavajjhala [24] introduce the Pufferfish framework by con-
sidering the generation of the database and the adversarial belief
about the database. A subclass of the Pufferfish framework, called
the Blowfish framework, is investigated by He et al. [20]. Blowfish
privacy imposes deterministic policy constraints rather than prob-
abilistic correlations to model adversarial knowledge. A general
mechanism to achieve Pufferfish privacy is recently proposed by
Song et al. [38]. Xiao and Xiong [41] incorporate temporal corre-
lations into differential privacy in the context of location privacy.
Chen et al. [8] and Zhu et al. [45] give different algorithms for pri-
vacy under data correlations. To improve the utilities of these al-
gorithms, Liu et al. [26] present a Laplace mechanism that handles
pairwise correlations. Yang et al. [42] consider different adversary
models and formalize the notion of Bayesian differential privacy
that tackles tuple correlations as well. Yang et al. [42] further in-
troduce a mechanism that is only for the sum query on a Gaussian
Markov random field with positive correlations and its extension
to a discrete domain. For Bayesian differential privacy, Zhao et al.
[44] present mechanisms for databases with arbitrary tuple corre-
lations and elaborate the case of tuple correlations being modeled
by a Markov chain.
7 CONCLUSION
Recently, Dwork et al. [12–14] show that the holdout dataset from
i.i.d. data samples can be reused in adaptive statistical learning, if
the estimates are perturbed and coordinated using techniques de-
veloped for differential privacy, which is a widely used notion to
define privacy. Yet, the results of Dwork et al. [12–14] are applica-
ble to only the case of i.i.d. samples. In this paper, we show that
Bayesian differential privacy can be used to ensure statistical valid-
ity in adaptive statistical learning, where Bayesian differential pri-
vacy is introduced by Yang et al. [42] to extend differential privacy
for addressing the case when data records are correlated. Specif-
ically, we prove that the holdout dataset from correlated samples
can be reused in adaptive statistical learning, if the estimates are
perturbed and coordinated using techniques satisfying Bayesian
differential privacy. Our results generalize those of Dwork et al.
[12–14] for i.i.d. samples to arbitrarily correlated data.
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Appendix
A.1 Establishing eorem 3
To begin with, we first definemartingale and Doob martingale that
will be used in the proof ofeorem 3. A sequence of random vari-
ablesZ0,Z1, . . . is referred to as amartingale [9] ifE[Zi+1 |Z0, . . . ,Zi ] =
Zi and E[|Zi |] < ∞ for i = 0, 1, . . ., where E[·] stands for the
expected value of a random variable. A Doob martingale [9] is
a martingale constructed using the following general approach.
Let X0,X1, . . . ,Xm be a sequence of random variables, and let Y
be a random variable with E[|Y |] < ∞ (In general, Y is a func-
tion of X0,X1, . . . ,Xm ). en the sequence consisting of Zi =
E[Y |X0, . . . ,Xi ] for i = 0, 1, . . . ,m gives a Doob martingale. Note
that in the expression Zi = E[Y |X0, . . . ,Xi ], the expectation is
only taken over Xi+1,Xi+2, . . . ,Xm while X0, . . . ,Xi are kept as
random variables, so Zi is still a random variable.
eAzuma-Hoeffding inequality (see Lemma 2 of [6]) presented
below is widely used in the analysis of martingales.
Lemma 5 (Azuma-Hoeffding Ineqality as Lemma 2 of [6]).
If Zi |i=0, ...,n is a martingale such that |Zi − Zi−1 | ≤ c for each
i = 1, . . . ,n, then P [Zn − Z0 ≥ t ] ≤ exp
( −t 2
2nc2
)
.
Wenow continue the proof ofeorem 3. We first fixy ∈ Y, and
define a function д(x) def= ln
(
P[Y=y |X=x ]
P[Y=y]
)
. For function д, we will
define a Doob martingale Zi |i=0, ...,n with respect to Xi |i=1, ...,n .
Specifically, we define
Zi (x1, . . . ,xi ) def= EXi+1, ...,Xn [д(x1, . . . ,xi ,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn )]
for i = 0, . . . ,n; i.e., given x1, . . . ,xi , we take the expectation of
д(x1, . . . ,xi ,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn ) with respect to Xi+1, . . . ,Xn , and ob-
tain
Zi (x1, . . . , xi ). For simplicity, we write the sequence Xi+1, . . . ,Xn
asXi+1:n , and write the sequence x1, . . . , xi as x1:i , and so on. en
Zi (x1:i ) = EXi+1:n [д(x1:i ,Xi+1:n)] (40)
=
∑
xi+1:n
д(x1:i , xi+1:n)P [xi+1:n | x1:i ] . (41)
Replacing i with i − 1 in (41), we obtain
Zi−1(x1:i−1)
= EXi :n [д(x1:i−1,Xi :n)]
=
∑
x ′i
∑
xi+1:n
д(x1:i−1,x ′i ,xi+1:n)P
[
x ′i , xi+1:n | x1:i−1
]
. (42)
To find the connection between (41) and (42), we first note
P
[
x ′i , xi+1:n | x1:i−1
]
= P
[
xi+1:n | x1:i−1, x ′i
] · P [x ′i | x1:i−1] by
the chain rule; put it in detail, we have
P
[
x ′i , xi+1:n | x1:i−1
]
=
P
[
x1:i−1,x ′i , xi+1:n
]
P [x1:i−1]
=
P
[
x1:i−1,x ′i , xi+1:n
]
P
[
x1:i−1, x ′i
] · P [x1:i−1,x ′i ]
P [x1:i−1]
= P
[
xi+1:n | x1:i−1,x ′i
] · P [x ′i | x1:i−1] . (43)
Substituting (43) into (42), we establish
Zi−1(x1:i−1)
= EXi :n [д(x1:i−1,Xi :n)]
=
∑
x ′i
∑
xi+1:n
д(x1:i−1, x ′i , xi+1:n)P
[
xi+1:n | x1:i−1, x ′i
]
·P [x ′i | x1:i−1]
=
∑
x ′i
{
EXi+1:n [д(x1:i−1, x ′i ,Xi+1:n)] · P
[
x ′i | x1:i−1
] }
. (44)
In view of (40) and (44), we will prove |Zi − Zi−1 | ≤ ϵ by showing
for any x ′i that
|EXi+1:n [д(x1:i−1,x ′i ,Xi+1:n)] − EXi+1:n [д(x1:i ,Xi+1:n)]| ≤ ϵ . (45)
We have
EXi+1:n [д(x1:i−1, x ′i ,Xi+1:n)] = ln
P[Y (x1:i−1,x ′i ,Xi+1:n) = y]
P[Y = y]
(46)
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and
EXi+1:n [д(x1:i ,Xi+1:n)] = ln
P[Y (x1:i ,Xi+1:n) = y]
P[Y = y] . (47)
Under ϵ-Bayesian differential privacy, it holds by definition that
e−ϵ ≤ P[Y (x1:i−1,xi,Xi+1:n)=y]
P[Y (x1:i−1,x ′i,Xi+1:n)=y] ≤ e
ϵ , which with (46) and (47) im-
plies (45). Since (45) holds for any x ′i , we then obtain |Zi−Zi−1 | ≤ ϵ
from (40) and (44). Since i can iterate through {1, . . . ,n}, we have
proved |Zi − Zi−1 | ≤ ϵ for i = 1, . . . ,n. en we use the Azuma-
Hoeffding inequality (i.e., Lemma 5 above) and obtain P [Zn − Z0 ≥ t ] ≤
exp
( −t 2
2nϵ 2
)
for any t > 0. By definition, Zn (x1:n ) = д(x1:n ) = д(x)
and Z0 = EX1:n [д(X1:n )] = EX [д(X )]. Hence, it follows that
P [д(x) − EX [д(X )] ≥ t] ≤ exp
( −t2
2nϵ2
)
. (48)
We now evaluate EX [д(X )] as follows.
EX [д(X )] = EX
[
ln
P [Y (X ) = y]
Y = y
]
= EX [lnP [Y (X ) = y]] − EX [ln P [Y = y]]
= EX [lnP [Y (X ) = y]] − ln P [Y = y] . (49)
Since the natural logarithm ln is a convex function, we use Jensen’s
inequality to obtain
EX [ln P [Y (X ) = y]] ≤ ln[EX P [Y (X ) = y]] = ln P [Y = y] . (50)
Using (50) in (49), we have EX [д(X )] ≤ 0, which along with (48)
further yields
P [д(x) ≥ t ] ≤ exp
( −t2
2nϵ2
)
. (51)
For an integer i ≥ 1, we define ti def= 2ϵ2n + ϵ
√
2n ln(2i/β) and
define Bi
def
=
{
x | ti < д(x) ≤ ti+1
}
. Let By
def
=
{
x | д(x) > t1
}
=⋃
i≥1 Bi . By Bayes’ rule, for every x ∈ Bi , it holds that
P[X = x | Y = y]
P[X = x] =
P[Y = y | X = x]
P[Y = y] = exp
(
д(x)) ≤ exp(ti+1).
(52)
erefore, we obtain from (51) and (52) that
P[X ∈ Bi | Y = y]
=
∑
x ∈Bi
P[X = x | Y = y]
≤ exp(ti+1) ·
∑
x ∈Bi
P[X = x]
≤ exp(ti+1) · P
[
д(X ) ≥ ti
]
≤ exp
(
ti+1 − ti
2
2nϵ2
)
= exp
(
2ϵ2n+ϵ
√
2n ln(2i+1/β)−
(
2ϵ
√
n+
√
2 ln(2i/β)
)2
/2
)
≤ exp
(
ϵ
√
2n
(√
ln(2i+1/β) − 2
√
ln(2i/β)
)
− ln(2i/β)
)
≤ exp ( − ln(2i/β))
= β/2i . (53)
An immediate implication of (53) is that
P[X ∈ By | Y = y] =
∑
i≥1
P[X ∈ Bi | Y = y] ≤
∑
i≥1
β/2i ≤ β . (54)
Let B = {(x,y) | y ∈ Y,x ∈ By}. en
P[(X ,Y ) ∈ B] =
∑
y∈Y
{
P[Y = y]P[X ∈ By | Y = y]
} ≤ β . (55)
For every (x,y) < B, we have
P[X = x,Y = y] = P[X = x | Y = y] · P[Y = y]
≤ exp(t1) · P[X = x] · P[Y = y], (56)
and hence by (55) we get
P(x,y)∼p(X ,Y )
[
P[X = x,Y = y]
P[X = x] · P[Y = y] ≥ exp(t1)
]
≤ β . (57)
is, by Lemma 6 below (i.e., [12, Lemma 18]), gives that
I
β
∞(X ;Y ) ≤ log
(
exp(t1)
)
= t1 loge =
(
2ϵ2n + ϵ
√
2n ln(2/β) ) log e,
where log means the binary logarithm.
Lemma 6 ([12, Lemma 18]). Let X and Y be two random vari-
ables over the same domainX. If Px∼p(X )
[
P[X=x ]
P[Y=x ] ≥ 2k
]
≤ β , then
I
β
∞(X ;Y ) ≤ k .
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1 on Page 6
We let X ×Y be the random variable obtained by drawing X and Y
independently from their probability distributions. We also define
O as the event that |Y (X ) − Y (P)| ≥ τ . First, we use the con-
centration inequality to obtain P [X × Y ∈ O] ≤ 2e−τ 2/(2n ·∆Q 2).
is along with eorem 3 and the definition of β-approximate
max-information I
β
∞(X ;Y (X )) implies that for k def= I β∞(X ;Y (X )) ≤(
2ϵ2n+ϵ
√
2n ln(2/β) ) loge , we bound the probability P [(X ,Y ) ∈ O]
(i.e., P [|Y (X ) − Y (P)| ≥ τ ]) as follows:
P [|Y (X ) − Y (P)| ≥ τ ]
≤ 2k · 2e−τ 2/(2n ·∆Q 2) + β
≤ 2(2ϵ 2n+ϵ
√
2n ln(2/β ) ) log e · 2e−τ 2/(2n ·∆Q 2) + β . (58)
Suppose ϵ ≤ aτ/(n∆Q ) and β = 2e−bτ
2/(n ·∆Q 2) for some con-
stants a and b that will be specified later. en we obtain from (58)
that
P [|Y (X ) − Y (P)| ≥ τ ]
≤ 2e(2a2+a
√
2b− 12 )τ 2/(n ·∆Q 2) + 2e−bτ
2/(n ·∆Q 2). (59)
To ensure 2a2+a
√
2b−1/2 < 0 which implies 2a2 < 1/2 so that a <
1/2, we set a = 1/3 for simplicity. en 2a2+a
√
2b−1/2 = 13
√
2b−
5
18 . Solvingb for the objective functionminb>0max{ 13
√
2b− 518 ,−b},
we obtain b ≈ 0.12. Hence, again for simplicity, we set b = 1/8.
en 2a2 + a
√
2b − 1/2 = −1/9. Applying the above to (59), we
have
P [|Y (X ) − Y (P)| ≥ τ ]
≤ 2e−τ 2/(9n ·∆Q 2) + 2e−τ 2/(8n ·∆Q 2)
≤ 4e−τ 2/(9n ·∆Q 2).
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